<aside> 🟢 Use this prompt to inspect a public or authorised GitHub Actions workflow before a human decides what to change. It does not run code, access a repository, set policy, or prove that a workflow is safe.

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When to use it

GitHub plans to block pull_request_target by default for public repositories from December 2, 2026, unless an applicable Actions event policy allows it. Use the prompt to make an inspection note for one workflow you are authorised to review—not to rush an exception.

Before you paste

• Use only a public workflow or material you are explicitly authorised to share. Remove secrets, tokens, private repository URLs, internal hostnames, customer data, and incident details.
• No AI tool, account, API, or paid model is required. You can complete the manual audit card instead.

Copy/paste review prompt

Review this GitHub Actions workflow as an inspection aid. Use ONLY the YAML and facts I supply. Do not run code, suggest disabling security protections, claim the workflow is safe, or invent repository settings.

Return:
1. Trigger(s) used, including whether pull_request_target appears
2. What repository context or permissions are visible in the YAML
3. Whether any step checks out, downloads, or executes pull-request-controlled content
4. What facts are missing before a human can judge the workflow
5. A plain-English question for the workflow owner
6. A stop/escalate condition

If pull_request_target is absent, say “not found in supplied YAML,” not “safe.”

Repository visibility: [PUBLIC / PRIVATE / UNKNOWN]
Workflow file name: [NAME]
Workflow YAML: [PASTE PUBLIC OR AUTHORISED, SANITISED YAML]

Manual audit card — no AI needed

WORKFLOW FILE:
REPOSITORY VISIBILITY:
TRIGGER(S):
pull_request_target PRESENT? YES / NO / UNKNOWN
CHECKOUT OR EXECUTION OF PR-CONTROLLED CONTENT?
SECRETS / WRITE PERMISSIONS VISIBLE IN YAML?
WHAT I DO NOT KNOW:
OWNER QUESTION:
STOP / ESCALATE IF:

Illustrative example — fictional

A fictional public workflow uses pull_request_target, then checks out a branch supplied by the pull request. The right output is not a fix. It is: “Ask the workflow owner whether untrusted fork code can reach secrets or write permissions, and pause before changing policy.”

Check your note

• [ ] I reviewed only public or authorised material.
• [ ] My note separates what the YAML shows from missing repository settings.
• [ ] I did not treat an AI response as a security approval.
• [ ] A responsible maintainer or security reviewer owns any policy change.

Pair it with the Audit Card

Use the Fork-Safe Workflow Audit Card for the full five-step manual walkthrough and a final owner-review handoff.

<aside> 🔒 Do not use a third-party AI chat as a place to disclose secrets or private workflow details. If material is sensitive, keep the manual card in the approved environment and involve the responsible reviewer.

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